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Review of Sonali Chakravarti, Sing the Rage: Listening to Anger after Mass 
Violence (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2014) 
 
Anger has had a bad reputation among students of post-conflict justice. Its 
disruptiveness, its capacity to wreak havoc and push societies into a spiral of 
violence are some of the reasons invoked against a political confrontation with 
anger. Sonali Chakravarti joins the growing number of voices who defend anger 
and makes an attempt to recuperate its political significance for processes of 
dealing with a past of violence.  
 
The book ǯgiven in front of the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC, 1996 Ȃ 1998) and, based on a close 
reading thereof, it proposes three dimensions of anger that are relevant for 
traumatised societies: cognitive, confrontational and kinetic. Cognitively, anger ǯǡ
and requires that recognition be given to her status as an agent with dignity. 
Anger by the formerly excluded is politically very important in terms of what it 
tells us about the boundaries of the demos. Confrontationally, anger can target 
the limits of what is possible in terms of repair or punishment. It can appear to 
be disproportionate, extreme or erroneous, and its value consists not in what it 
tells us about justice, but in revealing the deep effects of the experience of 
violence on the person. Last but not least, the kinetic value of anger refers to the 
energy that anger can infuse political life with, irrespective of the cause to which 
it is attachedǤǯǡǲȏȐǡǯǯ the words she uses suggest ǤǳȋǤ ? ? ?Ȍ  
 
In order to valorise these three dimensions of anger for the future of the political 
community, the book recommends the cultivation of an ethics of listening: 
listening promotes inclusion and enables witnesses to become citizens who can 
build trusting relations within a safe public sphere. Instead of a visual model of 
looking at emotions from a distance, listening and responding are proposed as 
more productive practices in the wake of violence. 
 
The argument is positioned in contradistinction to two sceptical accounts of 
emotion. First, ǯǡǡ
is found too dismissive of emotion in its messiness. In making merit and 
propriety conditions for the validity of emotional expressions, Smith unduly 
restricts the type of emotions worth paying heed to. Thus, he cannot provide a 
useful framework for understanding the complex emotional circumstances of the 
TRC. Second, ǯ Ȃ and of the role of speech and 
narratives therein Ȃ could be productive for theorising the political value of 
testimony in the TRC, especially in terms of their capacity to bring novelty in the 
world that witnesses share with others.  However, ǯ requirement that ǲǳit is allowed out of the private sphere and 
into the public, as well as her worries that emotions distract citizens from 
politics, make Arendt an unlikely supporter of the TRC. The analysis of these two ǯǡ. However, it 
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remains unclear why, given the overall purpose of the book, the author chose to 
discuss them to such great lengths. While the question of theoretical delimitation 
is important, the reader is left wondering why so much space is dedicated to the 
detailed analysis of theoretical frameworks that are ultimately not used to 
meaningfully prop the overall argument.   
 
The merits of the book are many. It brings valuable insights into the various 
functions of anger expressed in moments of radical transformation and adds an 
important contribution to the growing scholarship trying to redeem emotion for 
politics. The main original argument proposed here is that the strong connection 
between anger and justice is not the only reason why we should care about Ȃ and 
listen carefully to Ȃ this often-maligned emotion. The shift from a visual to an 
aural model of politics is also theoretically interesting, as it has the potential to 
add new ideas about the kind of ethos polities need to cultivate in the aftermath 
of conflict Ȃ and not only. The discussion of the value and emotional risks 
associated with the development of trust is yet another reason why this book 
constitutes a theoretical reference point for scholars of transitional justice. Last 
but not least, the connection between the Eichmann trial and the TRC is 
provocative and historically interesting, even if contentious. In what follows I 
will highlight two areas of theorising that I think are problematic: the 
conceptualisation of the faces of anger and the substance of the ethics of 
listening.  
 
Regarding the faces of anger, the author persuasively argues that we should care 
about it even when it is not connected to justice: when it expresses needs and 
fears that are unreasonable and contradictory, and when it infuses our political 
world with energy. These aspects of anger, thinks Chakravarti, should make us 
doubt the merits of the cognitive account of emotion. Yet it is unclear why the 
author thinks the confrontational and the kinetic dimension of anger highlight 
the limits of the cognitive model.  
 
The book seems to unduly moralise the cognitive model of emotion by 
presupposing that the judgment cognitivists conceptualise as constitutive of 
emotion is necessarily moral Ȃ justice related Ȃ judgment. In other words, 
righteous anger is thought to be the only kind of anger cognitivists can 
accommodate. This is a rather narrow reading of the cognitivist theory of 
emotion. Robert Solomon himself Ȃ ǯȂ offers a 
very broad understanding of the objects of judgment in emotion: our own selves, 
our place in the world, our ideals, structures and mythologies give content to 
emotion (Solomon 1988). 
 
Moreover, affirming that judgments are part of emotion does not imply that 
these judgments are reasonable, non-contradictory, moderate, coherent or 
communicable. ǲǳforms of anger Ȃ anger that communicates ǯǡ
and invisible consequences of violence, or anger whose causes are not easily 
identifiable Ȃ are perfectly at home in the cognitivist paradigm: they are 
intelligible as ǯǯrole in it. Cognitivists do not think judgment plays the same role in 
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rational inquiry and in emotion, nor do they think the same standards of 
evaluation apply to both. I would like to suggest that what is interesting about ǯconfrontational anger is that it challenges the audience Ȃ and 
especially power-holders Ȃ with questions about the necessarily imperfect 
nature of justice in the wake of often-intractable forms of harm. Confrontational 
anger is also important because it requires special efforts on the part of the 
listener/respondent, and the examples the author gives Ȃ testimonies by Jean 
Améry, Notrose Nobomvu Konile, Nomakula Evelyn Zweni Ȃ attest to this 
particular aspect (pp. 143Ȃ149. 
 
 My last point about anger concerns its kinetic energy. To ǡǲ(T)he 
aim of a cognitive theory of emotions is not to reduce the drama of emotion to 
cool, calm belief but to break down the insidious distinctions that render Ǥǳ (Solomon, 1988: p. 
190). In other words, to say that emotion has a cognitive component does not 
mean that this is all there is to emotion. Cognitivists account for the physiological 
dimensions of emotion, for its expressive force and its action-orientedness. 
Including thought, belief, judgment among the components of emotions does not 
translate into an unnecessary intellectualisation of affect. 
 
Regarding listening as a practice of engaging anger productively, I would like to 
suggest that it merits further discussion. It would be important to explain why it 
is that the ears Ȃ rather than the eyes Ȃ have a better chance at capturing the 
various forms of anger. In other words, it would be important to explain why this 
is more than a change of metaphor. One could argue that the problem with ǯaccount Ȃ in the way Chakravarti presents it Ȃ is not that it is visual, but 
that it imposes a number of conditions on the ǲǳ
from where. What is interesting about the listening perspective is the kind of 
burdens it places on the listener in terms of her effort to make sense and deal ǯ. Unpacking these burdens and explaining how habits of 
listening could be cultivated in order to support a revised  account of politics Ȃ 
one that valorises the lessons from Arendt and Smith while avoiding their 
shortcomings Ȃ would further develop the argument.  
 
To conclude, Sing the Rage opens up an important space for thinking about 
emotions in the wake of conflict. Though sometimes theoretically imprecise, it 
successfully casts doubt over widely held assumptions about the public role of 
negative emotions. Last but not least, the book creatively crosses unnecessarily 
rigid disciplinary boundaries between political science, ethnography and 
political philosophy.  
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